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  The Supreme Court has long endorsed the theory of the 
“colorblind” Equal Protection Clause, viewing it as a mandate of only 
facial equality. Due to rigid doctrine that limits true protection to only 
a short, stagnant list of fundamental rights and suspect classifications 
and that requires proof of discriminatory intent, only the most blatant, 
purposeful inequality is within constitutional reach. Festering outside 
of this doctrinal sphere are powerful examples of state actions that 
impose disparate impacts on marginalized communities, such as the 
nationwide system of laws that disqualify individuals—
disproportionately black men—with felony convictions from the jury 
pool. 
  However, the door to a new approach for combatting such issues 
may have recently opened. In Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme 
Court embraced the interconnection between the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses to move 
beyond the restrictions of current equal protection doctrine and strike 
down same-sex marriage bans. This “equal dignity” approach 
embraces a different view of equality protection: antisubordination 
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theory, which focuses on ensuring substantive equality. This Note 
proposes a framework for applying equal dignity, utilizing the example 
of felon-juror exclusion to argue that it can serve as a principled 
approach for addressing disparate impact claims. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the early weeks of 2002, a fifty-four-year-old man named Sims 
was called for jury duty in an aggravated assault case.1 He entered the 
courthouse that day prepared to join his fellow citizens in fulfilling their 
civic duty as part of “the spinal column of American democracy.”2 
Upon arriving, however, he found himself challenged and removed 
from the jury pool for a surprising reason: under a Texas statute, he 
was disqualified from jury service because of a crime he had committed 
thirty-seven years earlier.3 In 1965, Sims, then seventeen years old, was 
convicted of misdemeanor theft, a crime for which he served probation 
and paid a hundred-dollar penalty.4 Now an adult running a retail store 
of his own, Sims was told by the trial court judge that “our law is so 
clear that . . . even a minor theft of a piece of bubble gum, if it got a 
conviction, it means you can’t serve on a jury.”5 
Sims learned a startling fact that day—he was one of the many 
millions of Americans who are statutorily excluded from jury service. 
Currently, a federal statute prohibits individuals who have been 
convicted of a felony from being included in federal court jury pools.6 
This ban is lifelong and can only be abated by restoration of the 
individual’s civil rights.7 In addition, forty-nine states currently have 
laws disqualifying individuals with certain criminal convictions from 
jury pool eligibility, with Maine being the lone exception.8 Thirty-one 
 
 1. Robertson v. State, No. 07-02-0109-CR, 2003 WL 1872934, at *1 (Tex. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 
2003). 
 2. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 30 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
 3. Robertson, 2003 WL 1872934, at *1. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(5) (2012) (declaring ineligible for service on a grand and petit federal 
jury anyone who “has a charge pending against him for the commission of, or has been convicted 
in a State or Federal court of record of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one 
year and his civil rights have not been restored”). 
 7. Id. 
 8. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1211 (2013) (specifying qualifications for jury service 
without mentioning prior criminal conviction). Colorado has no restriction on felons serving on 
trial juries but does disqualify them from grand jury duty. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-71-105(3) 
(West 2016) (“A prospective grand juror shall be disqualified if he or she has previously been 
convicted of a felony.”). 
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of those states have lifelong bans on state court jury pool eligibility for 
individuals who have been convicted of a felony,9 while eighteen states 
have juror-qualification laws that specify the length of bans placed on 
those with prior felony convictions, ranging from release from prison 
all the way to the obtainment of an official pardon.10 Thirteen states 
even disqualify individuals with certain misdemeanor convictions.11  
Given how widespread they are, these laws unsurprisingly 
disqualify a large percentage of the American population from jury 
service.12 Although quantifying the exact number of felons in the 
United States is tricky,13 a 2016 study put the number as high as 23 
million people.14 Even estimates on the lower end of the scale suggest 
that up to 16 million Americans may be statutorily banned from the 
federal jury pool as a result of convictions at both the state and federal 
levels.15  
Perhaps more importantly, however, these exclusion laws have a 
malignant effect that might not be immediately apparent: they create a 
harsh, disparate impact on communities of color.16 Although only 
 
 9. Brian C. Kalt, The Exclusion of Felons From Jury Service, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 65, 67 
(2003); see also Vida B. Johnson, Arresting Batson: How Striking Jurors Based on Arrest Records 
Violates Batson, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 387, 419–24 (2016) (listing state laws). 
 10. Anna Roberts, Casual Ostracism: Jury Exclusion on the Basis of Criminal Convictions, 
98 MINN. L. REV. 592, 596 (2013). 
 11. Id. at 597. Some states also disqualify those who have been charged with, but not yet 
convicted of, such offenses. See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 35.16 (West 2018) (allowing 
challenge for cause for jurors convicted, indicted, or under “legal accusation” of either a felony 
or misdemeanor theft). 
 12. As described above, juror-eligibility laws often exclude both individuals convicted of a 
felony and individuals convicted of certain misdemeanors. Since felons are excluded by the 
federal government and by forty-nine states, this Note focuses on individuals convicted of felony 
offenses and refers to the impacted individuals as “felons” for internal consistency. The same 
arguments advanced below apply to individuals excluded from the jury pool due to misdemeanor 
convictions. 
 13. Kalt, supra note 9, at 168–69.  
 14. Nicholas Eberstadt, Why is the American Government Ignoring 23 Million of its 
Citizens?, WASH. POST (Mar. 31, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-is-the-
american-government-ignores-23-million-of-its-citizens/2016/03/31/4da5d682-f428-11e5-a3ce-
f06b5ba21f33_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.767ce57af9ef [https://perma.cc/R3Y4-
T8AY]. 
 15. Christopher Uggen, Jeff Manza & Melissa Thompson, Citizenship, Democracy, and the 
Civic Reintegration of Criminal Offenders, 605 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 281, 304 
(2006). 
 16. See Kevin R. Johnson, Hernandez v. Texas: Legacies of Justice and Injustice, 25 
CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 153, 192 (2005) (describing the disparate impact on the Latino 
community); Kalt, supra note 9, at 67 (describing the disparate impact on the black community). 
In order to narrow its scope, and to rely on the best available statistics, this Note focuses on the 
disparate impact that juror exclusion has on the black community.  
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around 6 percent of nonblack Americans have been convicted of a 
felony,17 around 20 percent of all black adults—and perhaps more than 
33.3 percent of all black men—have been convicted.18 Most would 
therefore be banned from the jury pool for life.19 As a result, an 
estimated 29 to 37 percent of black men are currently excluded from 
the federal jury pool.20 Because of this racially disparate exclusion, 
although only 12.6 percent of the American population is black,21 one 
study suggests almost 30 percent of excluded potential jurors are.22  
This imbalance likely has serious impacts on the American legal 
system. The historic social science findings have been inconsistent in 
assessing the impact of the racial composition of juries on trial 
outcomes,23 but more recent research shows that white mock jurors in 
diverse groups are less convinced of a black defendant’s guilt than 
white mock jurors in all-white groups.24 The warping effect of all-white 
juries distorts many aspects of jury behavior; one study demonstrates 
that there are significant variations in the deliberations, openness to 
evidence, consideration of racial issues, and analytic behaviors of all-
white juries as compared to their racially mixed counterparts.25  
 
 17. Sarah Shannon et al., Growth in the U.S. Ex-Felon and Ex-Prisoner Population, 1948 to 
2010, at 7 (Working Paper, 2011), http://paa2011.princeton.edu/papers/111687 
[https://perma.cc/CDL4-K3KM].  
 18. Uggen, Manza, & Thompson, supra note 15, at 283. 
 19. See Kalt, supra note 9, at 171 (stating that while these estimates might not perfectly 
describe the number of black men excluded from jury service, they are “consistent with other 
estimates in other contexts”). 
 20. Id. at 113. 
 21. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 2010 CENSUS: SUMMARY POPULATION 
AND HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS 4 (2013), https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/cph-1-1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/D5NB-KY4Y].  
 22. Kalt, supra note 9, at 170.  
 23. See Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, White Juror Bias: An Investigation of 
Prejudice Against Black Defendants in the American Courtroom, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 
201, 208 (2001) (summarizing research on racial composition of juries and on racial bias in jury 
results).  
 24. Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making: Identifying 
Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL 
PSYCH. 597, 603–04 (2006). 
 25. See, e.g., Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a 
Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 111–12 
(1990) (discussing research indicating that all-white juries are likely to find that identical evidence 
is sufficient to convict a black defendant but insufficient to convict a white defendant); Samuel R. 
Sommers, Race and Juries: The Effects of Race Salience and Racial Composition on Individual 
and Group Decision-Making 97–107 (2002) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of 
Michigan) (finding that racially mixed mock juries deliberated longer, discussed more potential 
issues, and considered racial issues more often than all-white juries). 
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A 2012 study analyzed the impact of the jury’s racial composition 
on trial outcomes in Florida between 2000 and 2010, with unsurprising 
results. The researchers concluded that the “impact of the racial 
composition of the jury pool on trial outcomes is statistically 
significant,” and that “there is a significant gap in conviction rates for 
black versus white defendants when there are no blacks in the jury pool 
. . . [which] is eliminated when there is at least one black member of 
the jury pool.”26 Specifically, when there were no potential black jurors 
in the pool, black defendants were convicted of at least one crime at a 
rate of 81 percent, as opposed to a conviction rate of only 66 percent 
for white defendants.27 However, when there was at least one black 
juror introduced into the jury pool, conviction rates for black 
defendants dropped to 71 percent, a rate almost identical to that of 
white defendants.28  
This system has helped to create a self-perpetuating cycle. Black 
adults, particularly black adult men, are convicted of crimes at higher 
rates due in part to racial disparities in policing, selective enforcement 
of the law, and different levels of success in navigating the complexities 
of the criminal justice system.29 Once convicted, they are excluded from 
the jury pool, creating less diverse juries, which then convict black men 
at higher rates. This is a serious issue, especially given the already high 
level of distrust in the legal system generally and nondiverse juries in 
particular.30 This cycle of juror exclusion poses a genuine threat to “the 
public’s faith in the legitimacy of the legal system and its outcomes.”31  
 
 26. Shamena Anwar, Patrick Bayer & Randi Hjalmarsson, The Impact of Jury Race in 
Criminal Trials, 127 Q.J. ECON. 1017, 1019–20 (2012). 
 27. Id. at 1032. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See infra notes 171, 195–98 and accompanying text (discussing racial disparities in 
policing and outcomes within the criminal justice system). 
 30. HARVARD UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE OF POLITICS, Survey of Young Americans’ Attitudes 
Towards Politics and Public Service 29th Edition (Apr. 25, 2016) [hereinafter Harvard IOP Spring 
2016 Poll], http://iop.harvard.edu/youth-poll/harvard-iop-spring-2016-poll (almost two-thirds of 
18- to 29-year-old black respondents had no confidence “in the U.S. judicial system’s ability to 
fairly judge people without bias for race and ethnicity”); Hiroshi Fukurai & Darryl Davies, 
Affirmative Action in Jury Selection: Racially Representative Juries, Racial Quotas, and 
Affirmative Juries of the Hennepin Model and the Jury De Medietate Linguae, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y 
& L. 645, 665 (1997) (discussing a poll in which 67 percent of respondents believed that racially 
diverse juries reach fairer decisions than single-race juries). 
 31. Leslie Ellis & Shari Seidman Diamond, Race, Diversity, and Jury Composition: Battering 
and Bolstering Legitimacy, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1033, 1038 (2003); see also Johnson, supra note 
16, at 158 (“Racially skewed juries undermine the perceived impartiality of the justice system and, 
at the most fundamental level, the rule of law.”). 
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Despite a recent increase in scholarly attention given to this issue, 
the legal research and scholarship surrounding these bans has 
remained “scant.”32 And, significantly, traditional constitutional 
jurisprudence has not provided a means to challenge them; attempts to 
mount constitutional challenges to felon-juror exclusion have routinely 
failed.33 Perhaps the most important roadblock has been the current 
jurisprudence interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause.34 In recent decades, the Court has constrained the 
Equal Protection Clause by emphasizing the facial neutrality of 
challenged laws35 and by requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate that 
discriminatory intent underlies seemingly neutral laws.36 By relying on 
these constraints, the Court has enforced a particular theory of the 
constitutional harm that the Equal Protection Clause is meant to 
remedy: the “colorblind” equal protection theory. Making use of this 
theory, the Court has been reasonably consistent in recent decades in 
striking down state actions that are imbued with improper biases where 
intent to discriminate based on a suspect classification can be shown.37 
But when this intent is not provable, the Court has generally refused to 
intervene—even despite persuasive evidence of the disparate impact 
and genuine harm caused by the state action.38  
An alternative approach, antisubordination theory, focuses on 
“whether a law advances substantive equality by analyzing ‘the 
concrete effects of government policy on the substantive condition of 
the disadvantaged.’”39 Courts making use of this theory would consider 
the tangible impact of government policy to determine whether true 
equality is being furthered, rather than simply concentrating on 
blatant, outright discrimination. The Court’s decision to instead focus 
 
 32. James M. Binnall, Summonsing Criminal Desistance: Convicted Felons’ Perspectives on 
Jury Service, 43 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 4, 20–24 (2018).  
 33. See Kalt, supra note 9, at 75–99 (analyzing the failures of different challenges to felon-
juror bans).  
 34. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 35. Elise C. Boddie, The Indignities of Color Blindness, 64 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 64, 
66–67 (2016). 
 36. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240–42 (1976) (establishing the discriminatory 
intent requirement). 
 37. See infra notes 74–78 and accompanying text. 
 38. See infra notes 83–87 and accompanying text. 
 39. Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Constitutional Future of Race-Neutral Efforts to 
Achieve Diversity and Avoid Racial Isolation in Elementary and Secondary Schools, 50 B.C. L. 
REV. 277, 320 (2009) (quoting Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: 
Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1454 (1991)). 
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on suspect classifications and discriminatory intent has allowed 
inequality to fester, unchecked, throughout our society and legal 
system. The exclusion of felons from the jury pool is just one example 
of substantive equality being thwarted by overly constrictive 
constitutional doctrine. 
However, a new approach to equality may have been laid out in 
Obergefell v. Hodges,40 which declared state bans on same-sex 
marriage unconstitutional.41 In an opinion that largely disregarded 
traditional Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court 
focused on the interwoven nature of due process and equal protection 
within the Fourteenth Amendment.42 The Court used this combined 
lens of two constitutional protections to analyze, and strike down, 
same-sex-marriage bans.43 Through this recognition of the 
Amendment’s interconnected clauses, Obergefell’s reasoning may 
finally provide an avenue for easing the colorblind theory’s chokehold 
on the doctrine and rethinking the Court’s approach to disparate 
impact claims. 
This potential new approach, which this Note refers to as “equal 
dignity,”44 firmly embraces the ideals of antisubordination.45 In fact, 
Professor Laurence H. Tribe argues that “in recognizing that 
even unintended effects can render a traditional practice or definition 
inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment, Obergefell may well 
have laid the foundation for reexamining” the discriminatory intent 
requirement.46 Although the equal dignity approach has not yet been 
applied outside of the gay rights context or explicitly acknowledged by 
the Supreme Court, and although the recent changes in the Court’s 
composition raise questions about the continued viability of 
Obergefell’s reasoning, this explication of how equal protection and 
 
 40. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 41. Id. at 2607. 
 42. Id. at 2603. 
 43. Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 16, 17 
(2015). 
 44. This is the name given to it by Professor Laurence H. Tribe. Id. The name is presumably 
taken from Obergefell’s closing lines: “They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The 
Constitution grants them that right.” Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608 (emphasis added). Other 
scholars have given it different labels. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence’s Jurisprudence 
of Tolerance: Judicial Review to Lower the Stakes of Identity Politics, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1021, 1025 
(2004) (describing it as a “jurisprudence of tolerance”). 
 45. Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom? Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 147, 
174 (2015) [hereinafter Yoshino, A New Birth]. 
 46. Tribe, supra note 43, at 19. 
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due process concerns coexist provides an opportunity for advocates 
and courts to approach racial inequality in a new way.47 
This Note argues that Obergefell’s equal dignity approach can be 
utilized in analyzing disparate impact claims under the Equal 
Protection Clause, and that it provides a principled means for striking 
down laws like those excluding felons from jury service. Part I discusses 
the current state of equal protection doctrine and describes the ways in 
which it has failed to fully combat inequality. Part I also analyzes the 
failed attempts to combat exclusion laws in court. Part II discusses the 
Obergefell opinion, outlines a proposed framework for the equal 
dignity approach, and addresses the potential impact of recent changes 
in the Supreme Court’s composition on equal dignity’s future 
relevance. Finally, Part III provides an example of equal dignity 
analysis, applying it to laws excluding felons from the jury pool and 
concluding that the harshest of these laws violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  
I.  THE LIMITATIONS OF A COLORBLIND EQUAL PROTECTION 
DOCTRINE  
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause declares 
that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.”48 The motive of the Amendment’s 
authors was straightforward—their intent was to protect the rights of 
former slaves49 and ensure the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866.50 Congressman Thaddeus Stevens, when introducing the 
Fourteenth Amendment in the House of Representatives, described its 
aspiration as nothing less ambitious than “the amelioration of the 
 
 47. See, e.g., Luke A. Boso, Dignity, Inequality, and Stereotypes, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1119, 
1122 (2017) (proposing “that equal dignity is one theory of Equal Protection that can explain 
when governmental stereotyping is unconstitutional”). 
 48. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 49. See Paul Finkelman, John Bingham and the Background to the Fourteenth Amendment, 
36 AKRON L. REV. 671, 686–87 (2003) (noting that the congressional Joint Committee on 
Reconstruction concluded that “nothing short of a constitutional amendment—what became the 
Fourteenth Amendment—would protect the rights of the former slaves”). 
 50. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 436 (1968); see also Michael W. McConnell, 
The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin’s “Moral 
Reading” of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1281 (1997) (“The clearest and most 
indisputable purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to provide constitutional authority for 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which outlawed the Black Codes.”). The Fourteenth Amendment 
ensures this constitutionality by enshrining not only the protections embodied in the Due Process 
and Equal Protection Clauses, but also by ensuring that Congress has the authority to enforce 
those protections through legislation. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have 
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”). 
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condition of the freedmen.”51 The Amendment was passed as a way “to 
atone for our nation’s own original sin and extend our Constitution’s 
promises to all citizens.”52  
Put simply, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and 
Due Process Clauses were adopted so that America might begin the 
process of making amends for the evil of slavery. State actions that 
inflict a disparate impact on nonwhite communities continue to 
perpetuate related racial stratification in America;53 they should not be 
ignored by the courts simply because they are facially neutral. A more 
remedial Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence is required—one that 
can effectively rectify the serious inequality that yet remains and that 
is consistent with the race-conscious approach of the Amendment’s 
drafters.54 As the Obergefell Court recognized, “when the rights of 
persons are violated, ‘the Constitution requires redress by the courts,’ 
notwithstanding the more general value of democratic 
decisionmaking.”55 
A. Contemporary Equal Protection Doctrine 
Despite the race-conscious, remedial purpose of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and despite the often heated debate over the true 
 
 51. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866) (statement of Rep. Stevens). 
 52. Tribe, supra note 43, at 21. Admittedly, the Amendment’s authors also had their 
continued political control in mind. Reconstruction Republicans were specifically worried that 
Southern Democrats would use their potentially increased numbers in the House of 
Representatives—a result of the Thirteenth Amendment causing freed slaves to be counted when 
determining representation—to take control of the national legislature, all while suppressing the 
actual ability of freed slaves to engage in the political process. These political concerns likely lead 
to the inclusion of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides for the reduction of 
representation if a state improperly denies individuals the right to vote. WILLIAM E. NELSON, 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 45–49 
(1988). 
 53. Reva B. Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-
Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1129–30 (1997) [hereinafter Siegel, Why Equal 
Protection No Longer Protects].  
 54. See Jamal Greene, Fourteenth Amendment Originalism, 71 MD. L. REV. 978, 988 (2012) 
(“The Congress that enacted the Fourteenth Amendment also enacted race-conscious measures 
designed to ameliorate the condition of former slaves.”). For a detailed description of the 
decidedly not “colorblind” actions of Congress in the years immediately following the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s enactment, see generally Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative 
History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753 (1985) (describing various race-
conscious programs enacted by Congress). 
 55. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (quoting Schuette v. BAMN, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 
1637 (2014)). 
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meaning of equality,56 the Court has consistently interpreted the Equal 
Protection Clause as mandating only formal, de jure equality.57 Indeed, 
the Court has treated any “race-conscious government action [as] 
presumptively unconstitutional.”58 The Court has gone a step further 
than using this rule to attack harmful racial discrimination alone; 
rather, the foremost principle of the existing equal protection 
jurisprudence is the “commitment to protect individuals against all 
forms of racial classification, including ‘benign’ or ‘reverse’ 
discrimination.”59  
This rule of colorblindness is intended to eliminate the ability of 
the state to make any decisions based on race or other suspect 
classifications.60 Though earlier equal protection cases like Brown v. 
Board of Education61 did not mention colorblindness, it has long since 
come to dominate the Court’s equal protection approach.62 Despite 
thorough criticism, a majority of the Court has apparently viewed it as 
an effective standard.63 
Within this colorblind approach, two doctrinal methodologies 
serve as additional hurdles to achieving true equal protection. First, the 
colorblindness approach analyzes discrimination through a system of 
suspect classifications and related tiers of scrutiny.64 If a state action 
 
 56. Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REV. 951, 956–59 (2002); see 
also Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious 
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 319 n.3 (1987) (providing examples of scholarly debate regarding 
the merits and weaknesses of Washington v. Davis and discriminatory intent requirements); Reva 
B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race 
Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1288 n.23 (2011) (providing examples of the antisubordination 
debate in equal protection doctrine). 
 57. Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Undignified: The Supreme Court, Racial Justice, and Dignity 
Claims, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1, 10 (2017). 
 58. William M. Carter, Jr., Affirmative Action as Government Speech, 59 UCLA L. REV. 2, 5 
(2011). 
 59. Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in 
Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1473 (2004) (emphasis added).  
 60. Boddie, supra note 35, at 66–67. 
 61. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 62. Ian F. Haney López, “A Nation of Minorities”: Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary 
Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985, 987–88 (2007) (describing the current equal protection 
jurisprudence as a colorblind approach). 
 63. Compare Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All Else: Race, Sex, and Equal 
Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1011 (1986) (discussing why the colorblind approach to equal 
protection is incorrect and should be replaced with antisubordination), with Siegel, Why Equal 
Protection No Longer Protects, supra note 53, at 1130 (“[T]he Court is confident that it has 
abolished segregation and granted African-Americans equal protection of the laws.”). 
 64. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 717–23 (3d 
ed. 2009). 
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discriminates on the basis of a suspect classification or on the exercise 
of a fundamental right, it receives either strict or intermediate scrutiny. 
These forms of heightened scrutiny closely analyze the challenged state 
action and provide a significant chance of victory for the plaintiff.65 
However, if a particular state action “implicates neither a nonprotected 
classification, nor a fundamental right,” it receives rational basis 
review,66 the most lenient and government-friendly standard of 
scrutiny.67 This tiered structure therefore both fails to protect plaintiffs 
who have been discriminated against in the exercise of a 
nonfundamental right, and fails to protect against discrimination that 
is not based on a previously recognized suspect classification. 
Second, the Court has narrowly defined the forms of state action 
that it views as impinging upon equal protection, even where suspect 
classifications are implicated. The pivotal principle behind this move is 
the discriminatory intent requirement outlined in Washington v. 
Davis68 and its progeny.69 Under this rule, even substantial proof that 
state action disparately impacts members of a suspect classification is 
not enough to show an equal protection violation.70 Instead, a plaintiff 
alleging an equal protection violation must provide evidence of either 
facial discrimination in the statute’s language or discriminatory intent 
 
 65. Id. at 744. 
 66. Susannah W. Pollvogt, Beyond Suspect Classifications, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 739, 743 
(2014). 
 67. See id. at 743–44 (explaining that “plaintiffs overwhelmingly lose” under this deferential 
standard). 
 68. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 69. Washington v. Davis, on its own, did not necessarily spell the end of constitutional 
disparate impact claims. In fact, the Court there acknowledged that evidence of disparate impact 
could help demonstrate discriminatory intent, id. at 242, and in a case the next year, the Court 
included “the impact of the official action” on a list of factors to consider in determining 
discriminatory intent. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–
68 (1977). However, the Court reversed course two years later and “defined ‘discriminatory 
purpose’ so stringently that it made . . . disparate impact, almost irrelevant.” Kenji Yoshino, The 
New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 764 (2011) [hereinafter Yoshino, The New Equal 
Protection]. The Court held that: 
“Discriminatory purpose[]” . . . implies more than intent as volition or intent as 
awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker, in this case a state 
legislature, selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part “because 
of,” not merely “in spite of,” its adverse effects upon an identifiable group. 
Pers. Admin’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (citations omitted). 
 70. The Washington v. Davis Court stated:  
Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an 
invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution. Standing alone, it does 
not trigger the rule, McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964), that racial 
classifications are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the 
weightiest of considerations.  
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242. 
160 DUKE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE [Vol. 68:149 
behind it.71 As the Court stated shortly after Washington v. Davis, 
“[E]ven if a neutral law has a disproportionately adverse effect upon a 
racial minority, it is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection 
Clause only if that impact can be traced to a discriminatory purpose.”72   
Difficulties have arisen under this colorblind approach, perhaps 
most noticeably in the debates about racial considerations in 
education.73 However, the colorblind approach has been effective in 
recent decades at combatting the more extreme examples of facial 
discrimination. From canonical cases like Loving v. Virginia74 and 
Brown,75 to more recent cases involving discrimination based on sex,76 
national origin,77 and the ability to exercise a fundamental right,78 
outright discrimination based on protected classifications is struck 
down with reasonable consistency.  
Nonetheless, these two hurdles have drastically limited the scope 
and reach of the Equal Protection Clause. The Court has only extended 
heightened scrutiny to five suspect classifications: race, national origin, 
alienage, sex, and nonmarital parentage.79 In fact, the Court has not 
declared a new suspect classification since 1977,80 and it has since 
consistently refused to accord this protection to other seemingly 
 
 71. Id. at 246–48 (declining to adopt Title VII’s disproportionate impact basis for 
discrimination claims as the standard for analyzing constitutional equal protection claims). 
 72. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 272. 
 73. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 706–07 (2007) 
(striking down a school district’s decision to include race considerations in school admissions in a 
split 4-1-4 vote); Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Fisher’s Cautionary Tale and the Urgent Need for 
Equal Access to an Excellent Education, 130 HARV. L. REV. 185, 185–88 (2016) (discussing the 
ongoing debates surrounding affirmative action and its current legal status). 
 74. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that “the Fourteenth Amendment 
requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discrimination”).  
 75. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that racially segregated schools 
violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause). 
 76. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (holding that sex discrimination must be 
subjected to intermediate scrutiny); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (holding that the Equal 
Protection Clause forbids differential treatment based on sex). 
 77. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (explaining that national origin classifications are 
subject to strict scrutiny under equal protection). 
 78. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (holding that Virginia’s poll tax 
violated the Equal Protection Clause). 
 79. Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 69, at 756 (citing Trimble v. Gordon, 430 
U.S. 762, 766–67, 769 (1977)). 
 80. Id. at 757 (citing Trimble, 420 U.S. at 766–76). 
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deserving groups.81 Regardless of the reason for this reticence,82 the 
decades since the last expansion of suspect-classification protection 
likely means that its scope is limited to the groups that are currently 
protected. 
More important for this Note are the difficulties caused by the 
discriminatory intent rule. In practice, the Court has essentially 
required proof that the purpose underlying a state action is 
“tantamount to malice.”83 Predictably, this has been an extremely high 
barrier for litigants to cross. As the Court itself has acknowledged, 
“[p]roving the motivation behind official action is often a problematic 
undertaking,”84 and “[t]he distinction between being aware of racial 
considerations and being motivated by them may be difficult to 
make.”85 The discriminatory intent rule has therefore led courts to 
uphold a large variety of state actions that, though facially neutral, had 
undeniable disparate impacts.86 In practice, constitutional protection is 
 
 81. Id. at 756–57 (listing age, physical and mental disability, and sexual orientation as some 
of the most notable examples of potential suspect classifications that have not been recognized, 
despite ample opportunity). 
 82. Professor Kenji Yoshino argues that this is a reaction to “pluralism anxiety” in which 
societal unease over the nation’s expanding pluralism and the impacts of increasing formal 
protections of equality for more groups caused the Court to restrict constitutional protection to a 
very small and specific set of groups. Id. at 758–59. He provides an example of these concerns in 
action, where the Court refused to declare a new suspect classification: 
[I]f the large and amorphous class of the mentally retarded were deemed quasi-suspect 
for the reasons given by the Court of Appeals, it would be difficult to find a principled 
way to distinguish a variety of other groups who have perhaps immutable disabilities 
setting them off from others, who cannot themselves mandate the desired legislative 
responses, and who can claim some degree of prejudice from at least part of the public 
at large. 
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 
432, 445 (1985)). 
 83. Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects, supra note 53, at 1113. 
 84. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 228 (1985) (citing Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 
(1982)). 
 85. Miller v. Johnson, 115 U.S. 900, 916 (1995); see also Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 
Term — Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 28 (1976) 
(noting that “[i]f courts may grant relief only when plaintiffs have made a clear case on the record, 
many instances will remain where race-dependent decisions are strongly suspected but cannot be 
proved”). 
 86. See, e.g., United States v. Clary, 34 F.3d 709, 710–11 (8th Cir. 1994) (upholding federal 
sentencing guidelines that provide significantly harsher penalties for crack cocaine than for 
powder cocaine, despite national statistics showing that 92.6 percent of those convicted of crack 
cocaine charges were black). One of the most pressing examples of this indifference to disparate 
impact is McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), where the Court rejected an equal protection 
challenge by a black man who had been sentenced to death, despite statistical evidence of racial 
bias in sentencing decisions. Id. at 297. Admittedly, the death penalty may more directly implicate 
the Eighth Amendment’s bar on “cruel and unusual punishment.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
However, if evidence of racial bias or disparate impact in sentencing is strong enough, the death 
162 DUKE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE [Vol. 68:149 
often simply unattainable if government legislators and actors are 
clever enough to hide any potentially discriminatory purpose behind 
the cover of a legitimate aim; they almost always are.87 
B. The Failed Attempts to Challenge Juror Exclusion 
The Court has admittedly taken some strides toward combatting 
the pernicious impact of racial discrimination in the jury box. In 1879, 
the Court held that under the Equal Protection Clause, states may not 
ban black jurors.88 And more recently, in Batson v. Kentucky,89 the 
Court instituted a framework that requires prosecutors to provide race-
neutral explanations for using peremptory strikes to remove black 
jurors when the defendant has made a prima facie showing of racial 
discrimination.90  
Despite this progress, litigants have been consistently unsuccessful 
in challenging juror-exclusion laws.91 Numerous defendant-focused 
claims based in the Sixth Amendment’s cross section requirement92 
and in procedural due process93 have failed. But most important for 
 
penalty—which involves the ultimate fundamental interest, life—would likely be struck down 
under the equal dignity approach to the Fourteenth Amendment.  
 87. Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects, supra note 53, at 1135 (“[L]egislators 
do not make a practice of justifying legislation on the grounds that it will adversely affect groups 
that have historically been subject to discrimination.”). Another scholar describes this as a “long 
tradition of Supreme Court decisions imposing unattainable burdens of proof in order to deny 
and avoid claims of racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause.” David Baldus, 
George Woodworth, John Charles Boger & Charles A. Pulaski, McClesky v. Kemp: Denial, 
Avoidance, and the Legitimization of Racial Discrimination in the Administration of the Death 
Penalty, in DEATH PENALTY STORIES 229, 263 (John H. Blume & Jordan M. Steiker eds., 2009). 
 88. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879). 
 89. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 90. Id. at 97. 
 91. See James L. Buchwalter, Disqualification or Exemption of Juror for Conviction of, or 
Prosecution for, Criminal Offense, 75 A.L.R. 5th 295, §§ 3[b]–6 (2000) (summarizing failed 
constitutional challenges to felon-juror exclusion). 
 92. The cross section requirement, at its most general, mandates that “juries must be drawn 
from a broadly representative pool” of the community. Kalt, supra note 9, at 75. As the Court has 
explained, the requirement extends from the concept “that the selection of a petit jury from a 
representative cross section of the community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment 
right to a jury trial.” Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975). However, the Court has more 
recently made clear that this requirement “is a means of assuring, not a representative jury (which 
the Constitution does not demand), but an impartial one (which it does).” Holland v. Illinois, 493 
U.S. 474, 480–81 (1990) (emphasis in original). Under this view of cross section analysis, 
challenges brought against felon-exclusion laws have been unsuccessful. Kalt, supra note 9, at 75–
88 (describing the cross section requirement in the felon exclusion context, and surveying the 
results of cross section challenges). 
 93. Id. at 92–94 (describing the complications with procedural due process challenges and 
their usual connection with Sixth Amendment claims). 
2019] EQUAL DIGNITY & UNEQUAL PROTECTION 163 
this Note is the failure of claims that juror-exclusion laws violate equal 
protection. These claims have generally been made in two manners: (1) 
juror-exclusion laws violate equal protection through their disparate 
impact on black potential jurors, and (2) they violate the equal 
protection rights of felons as a class.94 
The failures of the first argument have been rather 
straightforward—the discriminatory intent requirement of Davis has 
served as a universal stumbling block,95 with even the most persuasive 
statistics about the disparate impact of these juror-exclusion laws 
proving futile. The laws are facially neutral with regard to race,96 and 
the common-law history of exclusion extends back “long before black 
people—felons or non-felons—had any chance to serve on juries,”97 
making it exceedingly difficult to show discriminatory intent. The 
similarly consistent failures of the second argument have rested on two 
simple bases: “[n]o court that has considered the question of whether 
being eligible for jury service is a constitutional right has answered in 
the affirmative,”98 and felon status is not a suspect classification.99 
Therefore, courts have applied rational basis review, consistently 
holding that the laws are constitutional.100 Given the Court’s reticence 
toward declaring new rights and suspect classifications, neither of these 
roadblocks seems likely to move.101  
II.  OBERGEFELL AND EQUAL DIGNITY 
State actions like the exclusion of felons from the jury pool can 
create widespread harm that current constitutional jurisprudence is 
simply incapable of remedying. However, Obergefell may have 
provided a new opportunity for advocates. This Part analyzes that 
holding and outlines the equal dignity approach that follows from its 
reasoning. 
 
 94. Id. at 88. 
 95. See, e.g., United States v. Greene, 995 F.2d 793, 796 (8th Cir. 1993) (rejecting an equal 
protection claim due to the lack of proof of discriminatory intent). 
 96. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(5) (2012) (excluding any mention of race in a federal jury 
statute that provides that a person is unqualified to serve on a jury if he has a pending charge or 
conviction for a crime punishable by imprisonment for at least one year). 
 97. Kalt, supra note 9, at 91; see also id. at 172–76 (discussing the development of jury 
exclusion in the English legal system from the fourteenth century onward). 
 98. United States v. Conant, 116 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1020 (E.D. Wis. 2000). 
 99. E.g., Hilliard v. Ferguson, 30 F.3d 649, 652 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 100. See, e.g., United States v. Arce, 997 F.2d 1123, 1127 (5th Cir. 1993) (applying rational 
basis review and upholding a federal law that excludes felons from jury service). 
 101. See supra notes 79–82 and accompanying text. 
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A. Obergefell v. Hodges 
The Court’s decision in Obergefell did not occur in a vacuum. Over 
the previous quarter of a century, the Court had grappled with gay 
rights issues and with the concept of dignity in a series of cases. The 
most recent of these cases, United States v. Windsor,102 was an 
important step in this process, but its holding was an idiosyncratic 
decision based in federalism concerns.103 The two cases prior, however, 
help elucidate Obergefell’s approach. 
The first of these cases, Romer v. Evans,104 assessed the 
constitutionality of a Colorado referendum amending the state 
constitution to entirely forbid any governmental or judicial protection 
of gay, lesbian, or bisexual people on the basis of their sexual 
orientation.105 Rather than declaring sexual orientation a suspect 
classification, the Court applied rational basis review and came to what 
was then a surprising conclusion—even under this most deferential 
standard of scrutiny, the Colorado referendum violated the Equal 
Protection Clause.106 Apparently unwilling to extend the reach of equal 
protection, but equally unwilling to let such blatant discrimination 
stand, the Court arguably warped the rational basis standard to strike 
down the amendment.107 
Six years later, the Court returned to the arena of gay rights in 
Lawrence v. Texas.108 Faced with a Texas sodomy statute similar to one 
it had previously upheld in Bowers v. Hardwick,109 the Court explicitly 
overruled that precedent and struck down the statute as a violation of 
due process.110 In a passage that presaged the more expansive 
 
 102. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013). 
 103. See id. at 775 (explaining that the federal Defense of Marriage Act was invalid because 
it sought to disparage persons that a state had deemed worthy of protection). 
 104. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 105. Id. at 624. 
 106. Id. at 632.  
 107. This surprisingly stringent application of rational basis review has since been referred to 
as an example of “rational basis with bite.” E.g., Jeremy B. Smith, Note, The Flaws 
of Rational Basis with Bite: Why the Supreme Court Should Acknowledge Its Application of 
Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Sexual Orientation, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2769, 
2770 (2005) (citing Gayle Lynn Pattinga, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any 
Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 780 (1987)). 
 108. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 109. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 110. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
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explanation that would come twelve years later in Obergefell,111 the 
Court stated that “[e]quality of treatment and the due process right to 
demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of 
liberty are linked in important respects.”112  
Lawrence also illustrated the influence of the concept of dignity 
on the Court’s reasoning. The opinion acknowledged the innate 
humanity of the impacted groups and confronted the “stigma” wrought 
by the challenged statute113—the validity of which hinged on Bowers, a 
case that the Court declared “demean[ed] the lives of homosexual 
persons” simply by existing as valid precedent.114 Finally, the Court 
demonstrated its willingness to move beyond traditional, “colorblind” 
equal protection doctrine. Even though the issue lent itself easily to an 
equal protection opinion, and though the language utilized “sounds 
almost entirely in equal protection,”115 the Court approached the 
question as a due process issue. This approach gave stronger protection 
to a historically subordinated group by forcing Texas to “level up” and 
affirmatively grant the pursued right to everyone.116  
Against the backdrop of these precedents, the Court took up the 
constitutionality of the same-sex-marriage bans at issue in Obergefell. 
Before the opinion was released, legal analysts had theorized 
numerous ways the Court might strike down the bans, many of which 
focused on traditional applications of the Equal Protection Clause.117 
However, the Court followed none of these routes, and it mostly 
eschewed the traditional avenues for analyzing Fourteenth 
 
 111. See Yoshino, A New Birth, supra note 45, at 169 (“The Obergefell methodology is 
strikingly different from the Glucksberg methodology. It is much more akin to what Justice 
Kennedy did in Lawrence.”). 
 112. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575.  
 113. Id. 
 114. Id.  
 115. Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 
117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 99 (2003). 
 116. Id.; Yoshino, A New Birth, supra note 69, at 173. 
 117. See, e.g., Yoshino, A New Birth, supra note 45, at 147 (suggesting that the laws would not 
have survived even deferential review); Ariel Schneller, How Justice Kennedy Could Have Baked 
a Better Fortune Cookie, L.A. TIMES (June 29, 2015, 4:09 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-
oe-0629-schneller-kennedy-20150629-story.html [https://perma.cc/XT8R-ZT3D] (proposing that 
the Court could have declared sexual orientation a suspect classification and applied heightened 
scrutiny); Ilya Somin, A Great Decision on Same-Sex Marriage – But Based on Dubious 
Reasoning, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 26, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/06/26/a-great-decision-on-
same-sex-marriage-but-based-on-dubious-reasoning/?utm_term=.74f4b7fe0cee [https:// 
perma.cc/CT2S-N7AY] (including among several alternative justifications that sexual orientation 
could be covered by the heightened scrutiny that is applied to gender discrimination). 
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Amendment claims, completely ignoring the conventional tiers of 
scrutiny.118 Instead, the opinion focused on the concept of equal 
dignity, describing the challenged marriage laws as infringing on both 
due process and equal protection rights in an intertwined, rather than 
parallel, way.119 Perhaps most importantly, the opinion did not ground 
its holding in the type of formalistic, colorblind equality requirements 
many expected, instead firmly embracing the values of 
antisubordination.120 
The opinion began with a discussion of due process and the 
fundamental right of marriage.121 In discussing the uniquely 
fundamental role marriage plays in American society,122 however, the 
Court focused in particular on the inherent dignity in the bond forged 
between two people who make the choice to marry.123 Revealingly, the 
opinion spoke at length about the effects of same-sex-marriage bans on 
the gay community, rather than on the simple fact of facial inequality. 
The opinion stated that the bans taught “that gays and lesbians are 
unequal in important respects.”124  
The Court then delved more directly into equal protection. After 
laying out the interconnected nature of liberty and equality within the 
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,125 the Court continued to discuss the dignitary effects of 
the challenged laws. Strikingly, the Court openly embraced 
antisubordination, directly stating that “[t]he imposition of this 
disability on gays and lesbians serves to disrespect and subordinate 
them.”126 Importantly, the Court did not extend suspect-classification 
 
 118. The phrases “rational basis,” “intermediate scrutiny,” and “heightened scrutiny” do not 
appear in the opinion. The phrase “strict scrutiny” appears only once, and even then only in a 
description of a 1993 opinion by the Hawaiian Supreme Court. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 
2584, 2596–97 (2015). This is less surprising than one might think; the gay rights cases leading up 
to Obergefell, as well as Obergefell itself, appear to show the Court drifting away from traditional 
tiers of scrutiny. Katie R. Eyer, Constitutional Crossroads and the Canon of Rational Basis Review, 
48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 527, 530 (2014). 
 119. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603–05; Yoshino, A New Birth, supra note 45, at 172. 
 120. Boso, supra note 47, at 1133–34; see Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604–05 (“Especially against 
a long history of disapproval of their relationships, this denial to same-sex couples of the right to 
marry works a grave and continuing harm. The imposition of this disability on gays and lesbians 
serves to disrespect and subordinate them.”). 
 121. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598. 
 122. Id. at 2601. 
 123. Id. at 2599. 
 124. Id. at 2602. 
 125. Id. at 2602–03. 
 126. Id. at 2604 (emphasis added). 
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status to sexual orientation.127 Instead, the Court declared that the 
challenged laws both “burden the liberty of same-sex couples, and . . . 
abridge central precepts of equality,” and that they therefore violate 
both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.128 This elucidation 
of the interwoven values of due process and equal protection serves as 
the basis for the equal dignity approach taken up in this Note. 
B. The Equal Dignity Approach to Fourteenth Amendment Analysis 
Although Obergefell and its methodology encountered significant 
opposition,129 causing concern even among some supporters of the 
LGBT rights movement,130 the equal dignity approach rooted in 
Obergefell provides a means for furthering the full freedom that the 
Fourteenth Amendment was designed to ensure. As the Court 
described:  
Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal protection . . . 
may be instructive as to the meaning and reach of [each] other. In any 
particular case one Clause may be thought to capture the essence of 
the right in a more accurate and comprehensive way, even as the two 
Clauses may converge in the identification and definition of the right. 
This interrelation of the two principles furthers our understanding of 
what freedom is and must become.131 
This language is admittedly lacking clarity in terms of crafting a 
workable methodology—a problem this Note attempts to solve by 
providing a methodology for the equal dignity approach and by 
discussing the need for this evolution of Fourteenth Amendment 
doctrine. 
 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See id. at 2630 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the majority’s “showy profundities” as 
“profoundly incoherent” and “couched in a style that is as pretentious as its content is egotistic”); 
id. at 2639 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s musings [on dignity] are . . . deeply 
misguided.”); Schneller, supra note 117 (calling the majority’s analysis “laughable”). 
Interestingly, Justice Thomas has himself approvingly referenced dignitary effects in the 
Fourteenth Amendment context. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 678 (2002) (“[T]he 
Fourteenth Amendment ‘added greatly to the dignity and glory of American citizenship . . . .’” 
(quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 555 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting))). 
 130. See, e.g., Brian Beutler, Anthony Kennedy’s Same-Sex Marriage Opinion Was a Logical 
Disaster, NEW REPUBLIC (July 1, 2015), https://newrepublic.com/article/122210/anthony-
kennedys-same-sex-marriage-opinion-was-logical-disaster [https://perma.cc/NPX8-YAGW] (“It 
was the correct ruling, but John Roberts’s dissent completely outmatched him.”); Somin, supra 
note 117 (“Today’s Supreme Court decision on same-sex marriage is a great result, but based on 
dubious reasoning.”). 
 131. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603 (citations omitted).  
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1. Equal Dignity: Approach and Methodology.  Perhaps the most 
important aspect of the equal dignity approach in Obergefell was the 
Court’s apparent embrace of the antisubordination principle. 
Traditionally, the Court has analyzed equal protection questions 
through a narrowly structured, colorblind approach that focuses less on 
ensuring true equality, and more on ensuring that the government does 
not make decisions based on impermissible classifications.132 Likely 
due to concern over expanding this protection too far, the Court, over 
time, stringently limited the classifications that were off-limits to the 
government, focusing on a specific list of suspect classifications that are 
analyzed under a tiers-of-scrutiny structure.133 In Obergefell, the Court 
had an easy out—expand the list of classifications to include sexual 
orientation. 
The Obergefell Court, however, took a different route, embracing 
the remedial purpose behind the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
interconnected clauses. The Court essentially ignored the suspect-
classifications barrier that had been constructed under the traditional, 
colorblind approach. Instead, the Court apparently decided that, in 
light of the antisubordination concerns before it, the listed 
classifications and associated tiers of scrutiny simply did not matter—
and accordingly did not even mention them.134 The Court instead 
analyzed the question under this antisubordination-based approach 
and determined that the discrimination in question simply could not 
stand. 
This approach, taken a step further, can be applied with similar 
effect to the discriminatory intent rule. In Obergefell, discriminatory 
intent was not at issue—it was irrelevant because the same-sex-
marriage bans were facially discriminatory. But to see how Obergefell 
would deal with the rule, consider its treatment—or omission—of 
suspect classifications. Under the Obergefell equal dignity approach, 
focusing on only a short list of specific suspect classifications cannot 
advance the vision of true equality embodied in the antisubordination 
theory. Accordingly, doctrinal requirements that do not fit this 
conception of equality should not limit the ability to ensure it. It follows 
that the equal dignity approach would have a similar impact on the 
discriminatory intent rule—a feature of the traditional, colorblind 
approach that serves only to limit constitutional protection. Equal 
 
 132. See supra Part I.A (describing the colorblind equal protection approach and its 
difference from the more remedial antisubordination view). 
 133. See supra notes 79–82 and accompanying text. 
 134. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
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dignity, with antisubordination values at its core, is a remedial 
approach for combatting serious inequality in all its forms. Even if the 
government did not intend them, sufficiently harmful disparate 
impacts continue to perpetuate inequality throughout American 
society, including the exact racial inequality that spurred the enactment 
of the Equal Protection Clause. 
However, this approach is far from a wholesale endorsement of 
disparate impact claims. Rather, a claim based on equal dignity 
requires three elements: (1) significant, persuasive evidence of a 
disproportionate impact on (2) a historically subordinated group,135 
which (3) either infringes on a fundamental liberty right or implicates 
substantial liberty interests.136 A disparate impact claim that presents 
evidence of these factors should then be weighed against the 
government’s interests in sustaining the challenged practice or law. The 
court should then determine whether the challenged law infringes on 
substantive equality severely enough to overcome the government’s 
interests and thus warrant being struck down.  
The first two elements of this equal dignity claim are centered in 
the antisubordination principle. In the simplest terms, the 
antisubordination theory mandates that when a court attempts to 
determine the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections and 
rights, “one of the major inputs into any such analysis will be the impact 
of granting or denying such [protection] to historically subordinated 
groups.”137 By acknowledging that rectifying this historical inequality 
inherently works to fulfill the Amendment’s purpose and promise, the 
antisubordination theory provides an avenue for the Court to move 
beyond the discriminatory intent requirement in special 
circumstances.138 It is also in keeping with the Court’s prior history, a 
history in which antisubordination ideals have long been embraced 
 
 135. One admitted difficulty will be determining how courts should establish what constitutes 
a historically subordinated group and what makes this calculation different from the already 
defunct process by which the Court identifies suspect classifications. Yoshino attempts to solve 
this through examples like polygamists, which he thinks would not qualify as a subordinated 
group. Yoshino, A New Birth, supra note 45, at 177–79. For now, it suffices to say that the 
definition of “historically subordinated” groups is clearly broader than that of suspect 
classifications because its origins in the gay rights cases show that it necessarily includes sexual 
orientation. 
 136. For an explanation of equal dignity’s specific focus on liberty interests, see infra notes 
139–45 and the accompanying discussion. 
 137. Yoshino, A New Birth, supra note 45, at 174. 
 138. Tribe, supra note 43, at 19. 
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outside the equal protection context139 and in which dignity-based 
reasoning has been prevalent.140   
This background helps explain the third element of equal dignity 
analysis. As Professor Kenji Yoshino highlights, the Court has a long 
history of implicitly utilizing the interconnectedness of the Due Process 
and Equal Protection Clauses’ liberty and equality protections. Listing 
cases going back a century, he outlines examples of where the Court 
has leaned on due process liberty analysis to “further equality concerns 
[for] indigent individuals, national origin minorities, racial minorities, 
religious minorities, sexual minorities, and women,”141 and of where 
the Court has relied on equal protection to “protect certain liberties, 
such as the right to travel, the right to vote, and the right to access the 
courts.”142 As part of acknowledging the remedial purpose of the 
Fourteenth Amendment,143 the Obergefell Court simply went one step 
further. By explicitly and specifically recognizing the connection 
between “rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal 
protection,”144 the Court demonstrated that the interwoven 
 
 139. As Yoshino highlights, the Court has maneuvered around the limits of equality doctrine:  
“[Recent equal protection cases] signal the end of equality doctrine as we have known it. The end 
of traditional equality jurisprudence, however, should not be conflated with the end of protection 
for subordinated groups.” Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 69, at 748. Instead, 
“the Court has shut doors in its equality jurisprudence . . . and opened doors in its liberty 
jurisprudence to compensate.” Id. at 750. See also Kenneth L. Karst, The Liberties of Equal 
Citizens: Groups and the Due Process Clause, 55 UCLA L. REV. 99, 115 (2007), arguing that the 
Warren Court’s incorporation of the Bill of Rights through the Due Process Clause was an 
extension of its civil rights jurisprudence, in which the Justices recognized the racial and wealth 
disparities of the era, and Yoshino, A New Birth, supra note 45, at 174, saying, “What emerges 
from Lawrence and Obergefell is a vision of liberty that I will call ‘antisubordination liberty.’” 
 140. Justice Brennan invoked dignity in thirty-nine of his opinions on the Court, Leslie 
Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 171 (2011), and he asserted 
that the Constitution proclaims a “bold commitment by a people to the ideal of dignity protected 
through law.” William J. Brennan, My Life on the Court, in REASON AND PASSION: JUSTICE 
BRENNAN’S ENDURING INFLUENCE 17, 18 (E. Joshua Rosenkranz & Bernard Schwartz eds., 
1997). Justice Kennedy also infused the opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992), and his concurring opinion in Parents Involved 
in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 797 (2007) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring), with the language and emphasis of human dignity, a sign that Kennedy’s view of the 
concept within Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence was not limited to gay rights. Tribe, supra 
note 43, at 22–23.  
 141. Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 69, at 749–50 (citing to examples of such 
cases) (citations omitted). 
 142. Id. at 750 (citing to examples of such cases) (citations omitted). See also id. at 788–92 
(describing this history in greater detail). 
 143. See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text (describing the intent of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s authors). 
 144. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015). While an argument could be made 
that the Due Process Clause’s protections for life and property should also be included, the 
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relationship between the two Clauses provides a doctrinal basis for 
“compensat[ing] for judicial retrenchment under the [traditional] 
equal protection” doctrine.145 
What comes from this interconnection is an understanding that 
inequality is most damaging when it occurs in connection with the 
liberty interests that are central to American life. The most obvious 
examples of such interests are fundamental rights, such as the right to 
marriage that was at the core of Obergefell. However, an explicitly 
recognized fundamental right may not be necessary for an equal 
dignity claim if the inequality is great enough. Just as the Court has 
recognized the potency of such hybrid, cumulative claims in the First 
Amendment context,146 so too should strong enough evidence of 
inequality lessen the need for a previously declared right in the equal 
dignity context. Instead, being able to point to substantial liberty 
interests—such as jury participation, which is central to the American 
justice system—should be enough to make out an equal dignity claim 
where the disparate impact is exceptionally strong. 
Helpfully, the antisubordination theory also provides a built-in 
limiting principle.147 Because equality concerns for historically 
subordinated groups would be a necessary but not sufficient factor in 
the court’s balancing, any argument for extending equal dignity 
protection would have to overcome the government’s oftentimes 
important interests and the counterarguments of the opponents of 
expansive constitutional protections.148 To tip the scale in favor of the 
rare decision to strike down state action, parties would have to identify 
serious inequality and specific liberty interests. They should fail, 
 
Obergefell Court specifically mentions only this interconnection between liberty rights and 
equality rights. 
 145. Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 69, at 792. 
 146. The Court has previously recognized the power of “hybrid” claims of constitutional 
protection, even where one claim on its own might not suffice. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990) (discussing the potential for reinforcing a possibly unsuccessful 
Free Exercise Clause claim with other First Amendment challenges, such as freedom of 
association, speech, or the press). Given this acceptance of explicitly hybrid claims based on 
different clauses of the First Amendment, the interwoven application of equality and liberty 
ideals seems to be within the judiciary’s capabilities.  
 147. Yoshino, A New Birth, supra note 45, at 175. 
 148. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 953 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting in part) (“The Court . . . comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made 
constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the 
Constitution.” (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986))). 
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regardless of how convincing their arguments may be, if they cannot 
fully elucidate how the antisubordination principle is being violated.149  
2. The Need for Equal Dignity.  The focus on human dignity that 
sits at the core of the antisubordination principle, and therefore the 
equal dignity approach, embodies and furthers substantive equality.150 
As described above, the direct purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and its clauses was to protect black Americans from horrific societal 
and legal treatment.151 In the wake of Lawrence, Professor Christopher 
A. Bracey discussed the implications of the Court’s emphasis on human 
dignity for racial jurisprudence, proclaiming that “[d]ignity remains the 
core aspirational value in the struggle for racial justice.”152 Running 
through the words and works of black thinkers from Frederick 
Douglass and Martin Luther King, Jr., to Claude McKay and Tupac 
Shakur, Bracey asserted that the fight for racial justice in this nation is, 
at its core, a fight for the full recognition of human dignity.153  
Equal dignity thus forces Americans to reckon with slavery and its 
legacy. The Supreme Court itself made clear the pre–Civil War legal 
status of the black community, declaring that the question whether 
dignitary concerns applied to black Americans had a simple answer: 
“[T]hey had no rights which the white man was bound to respect.”154 It 
 
 149. This is the tool through which Tribe and Yoshino attack Justice Roberts’s argument that 
the Obergefell majority repeated the sins of Lochner. Tribe, supra note 43, at 17–18; Yoshino, A 
New Birth, supra note 45, at 175. In Lochner, the Court depended on a “right of contract” in 
striking down a labor statute that limited the working hours of bakers. Lochner v. New York, 198 
U.S. 45, 53 (1905). This decision merely demonstrates the extent to which that Court erred: 
Lochner was simply mistaken about the true vulnerability of the groups involved, and the opinion 
was grossly misguided in its attempt to provide protection and equality. Yoshino, A New Birth, 
supra note 45, at 175. Similarly, under equal dignity, a court necessarily must give genuine weight 
to the government’s interests, which in the case of the New York minimum-hours law challenged 
in Lochner was a distinctly persuasive worker-protection argument. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 51 
(quoting Julius M. Mayer, Att’y Gen. of the State of N.Y.). Such strong government interests 
should win out under equal dignity analysis.  
 150. See Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Procreation: Abortion Restrictions 
Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1736 (2008) (“[C]onstitutional protections for dignity 
vindicate, often concurrently, the value of life, the value of liberty, and the value of equality.”). 
 151. See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text. 
 152. Christopher A. Bracey, Dignity in Race Jurisprudence, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 669, 669 
(2005). 
 153. Id. at 669–72. 
 154. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 408 (1857). A particularly evocative example is the 
process by which racial identity was determined in court, in which a racially ambiguous individual 
was often forced to present “himself to the jury for ‘inspection,’ turning in all directions, taking 
off his shoes for examination of his feet, opening his mouth to reveal his teeth, removing his shirt, 
[and] showing his fingernails.” Ariela Gross, Beyond Black and White Cultural Approaches to 
Race and Slavery, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 640, 652 (2001). 
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was these infamous words, proclaimed by Chief Justice Roger Taney 
in one of the Court’s most reviled decisions,155 against which the 
Reconstruction Amendments were reacting. It is this history of 
purposeful, focused efforts to dehumanize black Americans and deny 
them dignity that should influence our reading and application of those 
Amendments.156 Similar accounts could, and have, been given of 
America’s historical treatment of Native Americans,157 Chinese and 
Japanese Americans,158 women,159 the LGBT community,160 and more. 
Through equal dignity, the courts can continue the process of righting 
these wrongs.  
Finally, it must be acknowledged that many of the criticisms of this 
equal dignity approach—and of the Court’s reliance on lofty ideals and 
vague, honorable-sounding values—are valid. Obergefell truly does 
lack the clear doctrinal lines and limitations that the Court has 
attempted to build into its Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, and 
its reasoning simply is not as straightforward or as predictably 
replicable as the dissents’ narrower reasoning would have been. But 
this does not mean that the equal dignity approach is incorrect, 
indefensible, or unworthy of a place in the larger constitutional 
scheme. The goals of the Fourteenth Amendment do not always lend 
 
 155. See Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 380 (2011) (“There is a stock 
answer to the question [of the Supreme Court’s worst decisions] . . . . We know these cases by 
their petitioners: Dred Scott, Plessy, Lochner, and Korematsu.” (citations omitted)). 
 156. See generally Peggy Cooper Davis, Responsive Constitutionalism and the Idea of Dignity, 
11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1373, 1373 (2009) (arguing “that our understanding of the basic rights set 
out in the Reconstruction Amendments should be contextualized by an appreciation of the 
Amendments’ anti-slavery origins”). 
 157. See generally DEE BROWN, BURY MY HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE: AN INDIAN 
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WEST (1971) (providing a historical account of American western 
expansion and of the concentrated governmental efforts to subordinate Native tribes). 
 158. See generally Dean Masaru Hashimoto, The Legacy of Korematsu v. United States: A 
Dangerous Narrative Retold, 4 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 72 (1996) (discussing the history and legacy 
of the internment of Japanese Americans); Hrishi Karthikeyan & Gabriel J. Chin, Preserving 
Racial Identity: Population Patterns and the Application of Anti-Miscegenation Statutes to Asian 
Americans, 1910-1950, 9 ASIAN L.J. 1 (2002) (discussing the application of antimiscegenation laws 
to Asian Americans); Charles J. McClain, Jr., The Chinese Struggle For Civil Rights In Nineteenth 
Century America: The First Phase, 1850-1870, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 529 (1984) (describing civil rights 
abuses of Chinese Americans in the nineteenth century).  
 159. See generally Sandra L. Rierson, Race and Gender Discrimination: A Historical Case for 
Equal Treatment Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 89 (1994) 
(describing the historical discrimination against women and comparing it to racial discrimination 
for Fourteenth Amendment purposes).  
 160. See generally SUSAN STRYKER, TRANSGENDER HISTORY (2008) (describing the history 
of the transgender community); Ralph Slovenko, The Homosexual and Society: A Historical 
Perspective, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 445 (1985) (describing the history of discrimination against 
gay and lesbian people). 
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themselves to such a constrained reading or interpretation. Its authors 
were attempting to establish true racial equality, something that the  
men who had just finished fighting the Civil War would have been 
perfectly aware would not be as simple as establishing a three-part 
tiered-scrutiny structure.  
The Court’s attempt to create simple tests for vague 
Constitutional clauses is noble, but that does not mean that that is 
always the correct path forward.161 Clear doctrinal lines and blunt 
reasoning are worthwhile goals, but they are not necessarily the right 
means for achieving some of our predecessors’ loftier aims. Equal 
dignity is not as straightforward or easily applicable as current equal 
protection jurisprudence, and its potential for abuse as an even broader 
version of substantive due process is real. These are reasons to invoke 
equal dignity sparingly, and they help explain why the same-sex-
marriage bans were the first time the approach was so openly utilized. 
But in the rare case of true injustice, of a law or legal structure that 
promotes the type of lasting and damaging inequality that the 
Fourteenth Amendment is specifically designed to combat, equal 
dignity is a valid legal doctrine. 
Admittedly, the future of this view of the Fourteenth Amendment 
has recently been thrown into some doubt. The retirement of 
Obergefell’s author, Justice Kennedy, has generated genuine concerns 
regarding the future of the jurisprudence he spearheaded.162 Beyond 
the loss of the Justice who wrote each of the most relevant recent 
opinions, the confirmation process for his replacement, Justice 
Kavanaugh, raised concerns that Kavanaugh, despite having clerked 
for Kennedy, will diverge from this part of his legacy.163 And, notably, 
 
 161. Even Chief Justice John Roberts has questioned the routine adoption of such tests. 
During oral argument for District of Columbia v. Heller, he responded skeptically to arguments 
regarding transporting traditional scrutiny standards into a new area of constitutional doctrine: 
Well, these various phrases under the different standards that are proposed, 
“compelling interest,” “significant interest,” “narrowly tailored,” none of them appear 
in the Constitution . . . . 
. . . I mean, these standards that apply in the First Amendment just kind of developed 
over the years as sort of baggage that the First Amendment picked up. 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-
290). 
 162. See, e.g., Did Justice Kennedy Just Destroy His Own Legacy?, POLITICO MAG. (June 27, 
2018, 8:10 PM), https://www.politico.com/magazine/amp/story/2018/06/27/anthony-kennedy-
legacy-supreme-court-218900? [https://perma.cc/KV6W-5MEC] (reporting legal scholars’ 
arguments that Kennedy’s retirement “has undermined much of the good he has done” and that 
his legacy “might very well amount to dust”). 
 163. See, e.g., Eugene Scott, In Kavanaugh’s Non-Answer on Same-Sex Marriage, Many 
Heard a Troubling Response, WASH. POST: THE FIX (Sept. 7, 2018), 
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none of the other current members of the Court’s conservative wing 
ever joined one of Kennedy’s gay rights opinions.164  
Another central question is whether, without Kennedy utilizing 
his position as the Court’s swing Justice, there remains any genuine 
support for his approach. Given the narrow majorities in the gay rights 
cases, the liberal Justices had little choice but to sign on to Kennedy’s 
reasoning. Had there been a genuine liberal majority, a more expansive 
view of equal protection—and the declaration of a new suspect 
classification—might have carried the day.165 In fact, it seems genuinely 
likely that an opinion written by one of the current Court’s four liberal 
Justices would have been based in a more explicit declaration of sexual 
orientation as a suspect classification, which would have provided a 
more concrete basis for protecting the LGBT community. 
For now, it is impossible to predict whether we have seen the last 
of equal dignity and its reasoning. But the criticisms of Obergefell are 
exactly why this Note was written: to help provide a greater level of 
workability and applicability to a deeply humane yet frustratingly 
unclear opinion so that this dignity-based approach can have staying 
power. Simply put, Kennedy’s view of dignity has been infused into 
much of our constitutional doctrine. Those looking to continue 
extending equality protections may view the existing doctrine of 
Obergefell, Lawrence, and Romer as a more likely route than 
expanding our long-stagnant colorblind approach to equal protection. 
Predicting the future development of law in this field is a tricky and 
 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/09/07/kavanaughs-non-answer-same-sex-
marriage-many-heard-troubling-answer/?utm_term=.da66ac7441d2 [https://perma.cc/6SNS-
6VQB] (arguing that Kavanaugh’s confirmation hearing “likely reaffirmed the fears of gay 
Americans” that “judges would allow for further discrimination against gay people under the 
guise of religious objections”). 
 164. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito dissented in both cases for which they were on 
the Court: Obergefell and Windsor. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2611 (2015) (Roberts, 
C.J., dissenting); id. at 2640 (Alito, J., dissenting); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 775 
(2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 802 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas has dissented 
in all four of the gay rights cases. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2631 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Windsor, 
570 U.S. at 778 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting). And Justice 
Gorsuch—though not on the Court for any of the four cases—appears to have a very narrow view 
of the actual reach of Obergefell. Despite Obergefell’s holding that same-sex couples are entitled 
to “civil marriage on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples,” Obergefell, 135 S. 
Ct. at 2605, Gorsuch dissented from a subsequent per curiam decision holding that both members 
of a same-sex married couple have the right to have their names on a child’s birth certificate; he 
argued that Obergefell did not even speak to the issue. Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2079 (2017) 
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 165. See, e.g., Beutler, supra note 130 (“[T]he price of admission for the Court’s four liberals 
was to join a muddled, unconvincing opinion.”). 
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perhaps impossible task; in the years after Bowers, one would have 
been hard-pressed to believe that an opinion like Obergefell was 
coming. But given the precedential value of Obergefell and its 
predecessors, attempting to develop a clearer approach for applying its 
reasoning to new cases is a necessary and worthwhile task. 
III.  APPLYING EQUAL DIGNITY TO JUROR-EXCLUSION LAWS 
In the short time since Obergefell was decided, scholars have 
advocated for a bevy of new rights and protections.166 Although many 
of those arguments have persuasive reasoning, they also demonstrate 
the pandora’s box concerns that animated the Court’s earlier doctrinal 
decisions.167 A more sensible application, and one that is more in line 
with the Fourteenth Amendment’s purpose, focuses on certain 
disparate impact claims. This Part provides an example of such equal 
dignity analysis, applying the framework outlined above to the 
exclusion of felons from the jury pool. 
A. The Antisubordination Concerns of Exclusion Laws 
The first step under equal dignity analysis is necessarily an analysis 
of the three requirements outlined above. The first requirement is 
easily met in this context. A highly disproportionate168 30 percent of 
felons come from a group that comprises only 12.6 percent of the total 
population,169 and possibly more than 33 percent of all black adult 
males are disqualified from federal jury service for life.170 Given this, 
there is little question that juror-exclusion laws have a significant 
disparate impact. There is an obvious aspect of personal choice to 
engage in criminalized behavior, but the reality is that the elevated 
 
 166. See, e.g., Jill E. Adams & Melissa Mikesell, And Damned If They Don’t: Prototype 
Theories to End Punitive Policies Against Pregnant People Living in Poverty, 18 GEO. J. GENDER 
& L. 283, 312 (2017) (“By urging us to consider the discriminatory effects of government practices 
on particular groups, [Obergefell’s] articulation of ‘equal dignity’ provides a new way to challenge 
Medicaid abortion coverage bans . . . .”). See generally Maxine D. Goodman, The Obergefell 
Marriage Equality Decision, with Its Emphasis on Human Dignity, and a Fundamental Right to 
Food Security, 13 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 149 (2016) (arguing that Obergefell can serve 
as the basis for a fundamental right to food security); Joshua E. Weishart, Reconstituting the Right 
to Education, 67 ALA. L. REV. 915 (2016) (outlining Obergefell’s impact on a potential 
fundamental right to education).  
 167. See supra note 82 (discussing the Court’s concerns regarding expansive constitutional 
protection). 
 168. See supra notes 17–22 and accompanying text (describing disproportionate racial 
statistics regarding felon status and exclusion from jury pools). 
 169. Kalt, supra note 9, at 171. 
 170. Id. at 114. 
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focus on black communities and black men in policing plays an 
inescapable role in felon statistics and racial disparities in criminal 
convictions.171  
Second, the black community is perhaps the single clearest 
example of a historically subordinated group. Beyond this, just as the 
same-sex-marriage bans in Obergefell had subordinating impacts on 
gay and lesbian people,172 so too does felon-juror exclusion impact the 
black community, regardless of the intent underlying it. Polling shows 
that nearly two-thirds of black Americans between the ages of eighteen 
and twenty-nine have no confidence in the ability of the legal system to 
judge people without racial bias.173 It may be impossible to separate out 
the factors that contribute to this lack of confidence, but the racial 
makeup of juries seems likely to play a role.174 And as discussed above, 
studies have repeatedly demonstrated the powerfully negative impact 
that less-diverse juries can have on trial outcomes,175 impacts that 
appear inevitable so long as laws continue to exclude massive 
percentages of minority communities from juror eligibility. Juror-
exclusion laws work to further distance the black community from a 
criminal justice system that many already do not trust. 
Research also supports the argument that felon-juror exclusion 
leads to people distrusting their government and doubting their own 
self-worth in society. One study has found that exposure to the criminal 
justice system, and the lifelong impacts it brings, leads many to 
“become deeply distrustful of political authorities, have little faith that 
the state will respond to the will of the people, and believe they are not 
‘full and equal’”176—attitudes that are antithetical to true 
rehabilitation. Alternatively, research conducted in Maine, the only 
state without a felon-exclusion law, suggests that inclusion in the jury 
pool actually has beneficial impacts, with the felons in that study 
 
 171. As civil rights lawyer and scholar Michelle Alexander notes: 
A black kid arrested twice for possession of marijuana may be no more of a repeat 
offender than a white frat boy who regularly smokes pot in his dorm room. But because 
of his race and his confinement to a racially segregated ghetto, the black kid has a 
criminal record, while the white frat boy, because of his race and relative privilege, does 
not.  
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 132 (2010). 
 172. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015). 
 173. Harvard IOP Spring 2016 Poll, supra note 30. 
 174. Fukurai & Davies, supra note 30, at 665 (discussing polling that found that 67 percent of 
respondents believed racially diverse juries reach more fair decisions than single-race juries.). 
 175. See supra notes 23–28 and accompanying text (describing the impact of racial diversity 
on jury deliberations). 
 176. AMY E. LERMAN & VESLA M. WEAVER, ARRESTING CITIZENSHIP: THE DEMOCRATIC 
CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN CRIME CONTROL 15 (2014). 
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reporting that jury eligibility helped them feel more included in society 
after their release.177 In fact, the results demonstrated “that juror 
eligibility facilitates changes in convicted felons’ self-concepts, 
promoting prosocial identity transformation, tempering the stigma of 
a felony conviction and prompting the discovery of self-worth.”178  
With the first two equal dignity elements established, the analysis 
then moves to the liberty interests impacted by juror exclusion. 
Although the lower courts have never recognized a fundamental right 
to jury service179 and the Supreme Court has never addressed the issue, 
the sacrosanct position of the jury in both the American legal system 
and civic life is undeniable. When the Founders chose to declare their 
independence from the British Empire, they specifically included 
among the complaints levied against King George III his “depriving us 
in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury.”180 The Framers of the 
Constitution viewed the jury as such a foundational aspect of the legal 
system that they included it twice in the Bill of Rights, in both the 
Sixth181 and Seventh182 Amendments.  
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the indispensable nature 
of the jury, declaring it “essential for preventing miscarriages of 
justice.”183 Juries are viewed as a central part of our civic community 
and as a safeguard of liberty184 that works to prevent government 
oppression.185 The views of the American public reflect this history: 
two-thirds of Americans regard jury service a “part of what it means to 
be a good citizen.”186 Just as importantly, it has long been believed that 
“a jury verdict in a criminal case is fair because it is the decision of the 
defendant’s peers.”187 Juror-exclusion laws remove a quarter of all 
 
 177. James M. Binall, Summonsing Criminal Desistance: Convicted Felons’ Perspectives on 
Jury Service, 43 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 4, 20–24 (2018).  
 178. Id. at 21. 
 179. Kalt, supra note 9, at 88. 
 180. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776). 
 181. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (guaranteeing criminal defendants the right to trial by “an 
impartial jury”). 
 182. U.S. CONST. amend. VII (guaranteeing a right to jury trial in civil suits). 
 183. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S 145, 158 (1968) (incorporating the Sixth Amendment 
against the states). 
 184. Jason Mazzone, The Justice and the Jury, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 35, 47 (2006). 
 185. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970). 
 186. John Gramlich, Jury Duty Is Rare, But Most Americans See It as Part of Good 
Citizenship, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 24, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2017/08/24/jury-duty-is-rare-but-most-americans-see-it-as-part-of-good-citizenship/ [https:// 
perma.cc/KJK7-S5QS].  
 187. Mazzone, supra note 184, at 39. 
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black adults from this communal American civic duty and ensure that 
black defendants often do not receive the same judgment of their 
peers. Even without a declared fundamental right, bans as sweeping as 
the current juror-exclusion laws inherently implicate strong liberty 
interests. 
B. The Government’s Interests in Sustaining Juror-Exclusion Laws 
Having established a prima facie equal dignity claim, the next step 
is assessing the government’s interests in sustaining laws that ban 
felons from jury service. The government’s main interests in such laws 
have been threefold: protecting the probity of the jury,188 avoiding 
antiprosecution bias on the part of felon jurors,189 and sustaining a legal 
practice that has a long-standing historical basis in the British common-
law jury tradition.190 These interests are legitimate; the government 
undoubtedly has an interest in ensuring that juries are as fair, unbiased, 
and moral as they can be. Unsurprisingly, these interests have 
consistently been successful under the rational basis review they have 
encountered.191 However, under the equal dignity approach, the 
question is whether the government’s stated justifications for banning 
felons from serving on juries truly outweigh the constitutional concerns 
raised. 
The argument that banning felons will help protect the jury’s 
probity runs into a basic problem. Though individuals convicted of 
crimes might be innately less moral or less law abiding, that assumption 
is less persuasive in a criminal justice system run through with racial 
inequality. The American system is one in which black drug possessors 
are almost four times more likely to be arrested for possession of 
certain drugs than whites, despite nearly identical usage rates across 
racial lines.192 Whites are also consistently “more successful than 
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nonwhites ‘at virtually every stage of pretrial negotiation’”193 with 
“[b]lacks . . . convicted more frequently than whites for the same 
crime.”194 In fact, the Supreme Court felt compelled to overturn a 
criminal conviction that was tainted by improper considerations of race 
in the jury-selection process just two years ago.195  
Given this reality, the connection between prior convictions and 
morality seems more tenuous. In fact, some of the key aspects of the 
criminal justice system push against using prior criminal history as a 
proxy for moral judgment.196 Although retribution, deterrence, and 
incapacitation are similarly considered legitimate theories of 
punishment,197 rehabilitation is the basic goal underlying the parole 
system198 that oversees nearly 80 percent of released state prisoners.199 
Research also suggests that “[a]fter an ex-offender evidences sufficient 
rehabilitation, the criminal record largely loses its relevance as an 
accurate predictor of contemporary behavior.”200 
This does not mean that it is illogical to assume that one who has 
committed previous felonies is less likely to respect the moral and legal 
norms of the community; with recidivism rates being as high as they 
are,201 it is reasonable for a legislature to conclude that it is more 
efficient to ban all felons from jury participation and only pick from 
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the rest of the population. However, the Court itself has firmly 
established that “the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, 
convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing 
alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution. Convenience 
and efficiency are not the primary objectives—or the hallmarks—of 
democratic government.”202  
Although the government’s second interest in juror-exclusion 
laws, avoiding antiprosecution bias, presents a slightly more complex 
argument, it is similarly unpersuasive. In fact, many courts have 
seemed surprisingly unconcerned when it is revealed that seated jurors 
should have been disqualified due to prior criminal history.203 Such 
individuals end up on juries with at least some frequency, oftentimes 
due to their failure to properly disclose criminal history.204 But when 
faced with such a scenario, numerous state courts,205 as well as the 
Eighth206 and Ninth Circuits,207 have decided that the inclusion of such 
a person does not always create a genuine issue. The Michigan 
Supreme Court recently made this determination explicitly, stating, 
“we fail to see how a juror’s mere status as a convicted felon can be 
considered sufficient” for determining impartiality or bias, despite 
Michigan’s clear felon-exclusion law.208 If the very courts these laws are 
meant to protect have little problem with the inclusion of felons on 
their juries, the bias justification for the laws does not carry much 
weight. 
Actual rates of bias also do not seem to support full exclusion. 
Although researchers have found that “few if any juror characteristics 
are good predictors of juror verdict preferences,”209 there has been 
little specific research into the presence of bias in jurors with prior 
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criminal history. One study does admittedly point to a noticeable 
antiprosecution bias demonstrated by about one-third of felons.210 
However, this research also suggests that taken as a whole, felons are 
not overly biased. In fact, almost one-third of felons were either neutral 
or favorable to the prosecution.211 And the level of antiprosecution bias 
that felons do demonstrate is identical to that of other nonbanned 
groups; the bias rate is particularly similar to that of law students.212 
These results may not entirely refute the bias argument, but the lack of 
a stronger correlation between felon status and bias does undermine 
the justification for the lifetime bans that much of the country 
utilizes.213 Prosecutors are also fully capable of discovering prospective 
jurors’ biases by direct questioning, just as they root out other forms of 
potential bias or conflicts of interest.214 
Finally, though it is certainly true that historical practice has at 
times played some role in upholding challenged laws,215 courts and 
legislatures have also consistently excised practices that introduced 
unfairness and prejudice into the legal system.216 It is also important to 
note that the American criminal justice system—including the rate and 
total number of felony convictions—has changed dramatically even 
within recent decades; the number of state felony convictions increased 
24 percent between 1994 and 2004,217 and researchers have estimated 
that the percentage of felons more than doubled between 1968 and 
2000.218 Accordingly, felon-juror-exclusion laws have a larger, more 
widespread impact now than at any other point in American history. 
When dealing with human lives and the malignant force of racial bias, 
the existence of a long legal history is simply not enough. 
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C. Results: The Harshest Felon-Juror Exclusion Laws are 
Unconstitutional 
Ultimately, the pressing constitutional concerns raised by 
excluding felons from the jury pool outweigh the government’s 
unconvincing justifications, and the lifelong bans currently enforced by 
the federal government and thirty-one states violate equal dignity and 
should not stand. Whether shorter term bans or other temporary forms 
of exclusion could survive equal dignity challenges is a question 
requiring more in-depth analysis than this Note can provide. But 
America is an organized society with a robust criminal justice system 
that has the power to imprison and execute those it deems deserving. 
In such a society, surely a belief in the idea that “all individuals are 
deserving in equal measure of personal autonomy”219 requires ensuring 
the dignity and respect granted by a criminal justice system that is 
generally representative and fair toward every community.  
Simply striking down felon-juror-exclusion laws may not be 
enough. The jury selection process is too idiosyncratic to ever fully 
ensure that prosecutors will not use peremptory strikes and challenges 
for cause to remove all felons, and such tactics can be utilized by clever 
attorneys as a work-around for discriminatory motives.220 However, 
forcing prosecutors to use their limited peremptory challenges221 rather 
than broadly banning felons up-front may help to alleviate some of the 
problem. Courts could also go a step further by formulating protections 
against challenges based on criminal history; these protections could 
mirror those formulated in Batson v. Kentucky, where the Court both 
required attorneys to provide race-neutral reasons for using 
preemptive strikes on potential jurors during voir dire and created a 
structure for addressing claims of improper motivation for preemptive 
strikes.222 Issues like these are neither insurmountable nor beyond the 
capabilities of the judiciary to address, and they should not stand in the 
way of upholding constitutional promises. 
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The Fourteenth Amendment’s goal of fighting racial 
discrimination makes it the correct tool for combatting this issue. In 
theory, this includes fairness in policing, the charging of crimes, pretrial 
negotiations, and sentencing; in reality, the murky, sometimes 
unconscious nature of racial bias is such that there may be no foolproof 
means for ensuring its absence from proceedings that include an 
inevitable and necessary amount of discretion.223 But when it can be 
demonstrated that an unnecessary practice is systematically and 
disproportionally excluding up to one-third of a particular race from 
an important aspect of American life, that is an inequality that can be 
tackled. 
CONCLUSION 
In Obergefell, the Supreme Court opened the door to a new way 
of approaching questions of equal protection—an approach that both 
provides an effective method for bringing disparate impact claims and 
reinvigorates the Fourteenth Amendment’s remedial roots. 
Admittedly, the harm inherent in excluding felons from the jury pool 
would not have been recognized by the Amendment’s authors, who 
were surrounded by racial injustice on a scale that is hard for modern 
Americans to comprehend. However, the Court predicted and 
forcefully addressed these concerns: 
The nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our own 
times. The generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and 
the Fourteenth Amendment did not presume to know the extent of 
freedom in all of its dimensions, and so they entrusted to future 
generations a charter protecting the right of all persons to enjoy 
liberty as we learn its meaning. When new insight reveals discord 
between the Constitution’s central protections and a received legal 
stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed.224 
Fortunately, we have that new insight—the understanding that the 
exclusion of felons from the jury pool exacerbates the exact racial 
imbalances our predecessors hoped to stamp out. Despite obvious 
detours and backward steps, the overall course of the American justice 
system is one of recognizing and attempting to excise racial bias and 
inequality. Rather than being a wild expansion away from the previous 
path Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence has taken, equal dignity, 
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and this particular application, follows that clear direction. With each 
passing year and generation, we try to move another step closer to true 
equality. Striking down juror-exclusion laws, while far from solving 
these problems, helps move us that next step.  
 
